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CASE COMMENTS
STRADDLE NOT A PURCHASE AND SALE
UNDER SEC SECTION 16(b)
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 regulates the secondary dis-
tribution of securities listed on the national exchanges, its main pur-
pose being to protect the investing public from the abusive use of the
facilities provided on the national exchanges. 2 To accomplish this
purpose, the act imposes a measure of regulatory control on the brok-
ers and dealers and and the methods and practices they use.
One area of particular concern to Congress in its consideration
of market abuses was trading by insiders.3 The investigation preceding
the passage of the act revealed that insiders frequently utilized knowl-
edge obtained from their elevated positions within their companies to
reap large profits from the market to the detriment of the outsider
shareholders.4 Congress sought to remedy such invidious practices by
including section 16 in the act.5 The subsection of particular relevance
to the following discussion is subsection (b). The underlying rationale
of section 16(b) is that removal of the possibility of insider profit will
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-78(h)-i (1958).
2Section 2 of the act sets forth in detail the necessity for security regulation. See
H.R. Rep. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73 d Cong.
2d Sess. (1934); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943); Sook and
Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
385, 612 (1953).
3Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines as an insider:
"Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than io
per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered on a national securities exchange, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer [corporation]of such security ..."
4S. Rep. No. 1455, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 32, 33, 47 (1934).
'Subsection (a) is based on the theory that if such abusive transactions are
publicized they will be discontinued. Publication under subsection (a) is achieved
by the mandatory filing with the Commission of a report setting forth the current
holding of the insider. The theory underlying subsection (b) is that if the possi-
bility of profit is removed, short-swing trading by insiders will be discontinued.
This is accomplished by providing that all insider profits occurring from the pur-
chase and sale of the corporate stock within a six month period may be recovered
by the corporation. Subsection (c) absolutely prohibits short sales or "sales against
the box" and prevents deceptive stock manipulation. Cook and Feldman, Insider
Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 386-87 (1953).
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bring about a discontinuance of "short-swing"6 trading by insiders. Sec-
tion 16(b) provides that profits in "equity securities"7 realized by the
insider from transactions completed within six months may be re-
covered either directly by the corporation with whom the insider is
associated or through a derivative action s initiated by any security
holder.
Before a cause of action can be established, the plaintiff9 must
show that the profit realized was obtained "from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
(other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six
GThe term "short-swing" profit relates to the profit received by a person within
a period of six months. For the computation of the actual profit realized from
short-swing trading, see, Cook and Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev 612 (1953). The general formula used to determine
profits was set forth in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943) as
'follows: "The only rule whereby all possible profits can be surely recovered is that
of lowest price in, highest price out-within six months...." Therefore, profits
may be found even though the transactions as a whole result in a loss.
7The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(1 ) defines the term "equity
security" as "any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or
without consideration, into such a security; or carrying any warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right, or any
other security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and con-
sider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe
in the public interest for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity security."
See Loss, Securities Regulation 1095 (2d ed. 1961). It is generally stated by legal
commentators that "options, calls, spreads and straddles should also be considered
equity securities if they confer upon their holders a right to acquire an equity
security." Cook and Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 394 (1953). There do not appear to be any cases on this
point other than the principal case of Silverman v. Landa, 3o6 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.
1962).
"The stockholder's derivative suit is a class action that developed from equity.
The suit allows the shareholder to enforce a corporate right against insiders or
outsiders where those in control of the corporation refuse to have the corporation
sue directly. Section 16(b) specifically provides for derivative shareholder actions
to recover insider short-swing profits if the corporation fails within sixty days after
the shareholder's request to institute a direct action to recover insider profits.
Arbetman v. Playford, 83 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Dottenheim v. Emerson
Elec. Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
OIn a derivative action instituted under § i6(b) the plaintiff does not have
to be a stockholder as in the usual derivative action against a corporate official.
BIau v. Lamb, 31 US.L. Week 1146 (2d Cir. March 8, 1963). The plaintiff may be
a debenture holder or a bondholder. Also, a plaintiff in a derivative action under
§ 16(b) need not have been a security holder at the time the cause of action arose.
Bemisch v. Cameron, 81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Further, the motive of the
plaintiff in purchasing the security is immaterial. Magida v. Continental Can Co.,
12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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months....,10 Although seemingly simple to define, the term "pur-
chase and sale" is extremely troublesome and elusive."
The difficulty of defining "purchase and sale" within section 16(b)
presented a novel question in the recent case of Silverman v. Landa.'
2
Plaintiff Silverman, a shareholder of Fruehauf Trailer Company,
brought an action both derivatively and in his own behalf as an indi-
vidual stockholder to recapture a short-swing profit allegedly realized
by defendant Landa, a director of Fruehauf. The issues raised were
submitted to the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The
court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's cross motion
for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.13
The facts were undisputed. On October 27, 1959, Landa was a
director and beneficial owner of 2,000 shares of Fruehauf common
stock, which was registered on a national exchange. On that date,
Landa issued three options to a "put and call dealer"' 4 in respect
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. 78 p (b) (1958). [Emphasis
added.] Section 3(a)(13), (14) of the act is the definitive section wherein the terms
"purchase" and "sale" are defined. This pertinent section is set forth in the text,
infra at note 22.
"Considerable difficulty arises when § 16(b) is used to recover short-swing profits
for the transfer of stock "rights" as distinguished from the outright purchase and
sale of the underlying security on the market. Generically, "rights" include option
contracts (e.g., puts and calls) and stock warrants, but for the purpose of § 9
of the act, it should be noted, "The terms 'put,' 'call,' 'straddle,' 'option,' or 'privi-
lege' as used in this section shall not include any registered warrant, right or con-
vertible security." A finding that a purchase and sale is effected in respect to such
rights depends upon the change or effect on the beneficial ownership of the securi-
ty itself. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956); Falco
v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 2o8 F.2d 6oo (2d Cir. 1953); Shaw v. Drefus, 172 F.2d
140 (2d Cir. 1949); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 16o F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947); Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943); Truncale v. Blumberg, 8o F. Supp.
387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Loss, Securities Regulation 467, 1097 (2d ed. 1961); 59 Yale
L.J. 510 (1950).
20oo F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
23o6 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
"The Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Association, Inc., is a voluntary asso-
ciation which adopts rules for the conduct of the business and the affairs of its
members. The dealers generally arrange for the purchase and sale of new options on
order, acting as principals rather than agents. The options are written in bearer
form by the members of the Association, endorsed by the stock exchange houses
and then bought and sold in the market. Section 9(b) of the act grants to the
Commission the power to prescribe any rules or regulations necessary or appropriate
to protect investors from any abusive practices regarding the purchase or sale of
such options. However, the Commission has not adopted any rules in this respect,
presumably because the other anti-manipulative weapons have worked so well
that it is felt that such rules would only hamper the legitimate use of options.
Loss, Securities Regulation 468, 1544 (2d ed. g6i); Filer, Understanding Put and
Call Options io (1959).
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to Fruehauf common stock: two "call"'15 options for 500 shares each
and one "put"'16 option for 5o0 shares. As a result, defendant issued
a "straddle"' 7 and a separate call for a total "premium"' 8 of $5,ooo
received from a put and call dealer. This matched put and call (i.e.,
a straddle) plus the extra call constituted a "strap."' 9 The fairness of
the premium was not in question. On October 20, ig6o, immediately
prior to the expiration date of the options, defendant's broker, who
had guaranteed the performance of the options, 20 assumed Landa's
obligations under the straddle in consideration of the payment by
Landa of $3,300.
The two call options expired unexercised on October 26, ig6o;
however, the put option was exercised sometime after April 26, 196o
(six months after the date of issuance).
In the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the main issue 2'
was whether a simultaneous issuance of a put and call in and of
itself constitutes a purchase and sale of the underlying security under
section 16(b). Unless answered in the affirmative, the premiums re-
ceived by Landa for the three options were not within the purview of
the act and not subject to recapture.
The theory advanced to support a purchase and sale was as follows:
Upon the issuance of the call, there is a change in the beneficial owner-
ship of the stock since the issuer has irrevocably bound himself to
""A 'Call' is an option given for an agreed premium entitling the holder there-
of at his option, to buy from the issuer of the option on or before a fixed date, a
specified number of shares at a predetermined price." 2oo F. Supp. at 195.
'"A 'Put' is an option given for an agreed premium entitling the holder
thereof at his option, to sell to the issuer of the option on or before a fixed date,
a specified number of shares at a predetermined price." Ibid.
""A 'Straddle' consists of two separate options, one a 'Call' and one a 'Put.'
Both the 'Put' and 'Call' are identical as to stock, contract price and time expira-
tion." Ibid.
"The 'Premium' is the amount of money paid by the buyer for an option."
Ibid.
"A "strap" is a straddle with an extra call. A "strip" is a straddle with an
extra put. Loss, Securities Regulation 468 (2d ed. g6i). Filer, Understanding Put
and Call Options io6, 107 (959).
""All puts and calls are bearer options and must be endorsed by a member of
the national exchange, who thus guarantees performance by the issuer. 2oo F. Supp.
at 195; Filer, supra note s9.
"Two other issues were presented to the court: (s) Whether the issuance of
a call constitutes a sale under § 6(c)(2) of the act so as to constitute a violation
thereof if there is no delivery of the underlying security within 2o days of issuance,
irrespective of whether the option is exercised; and (2) whether § 16(c)(2) extends
a private right of action to an injured party where a violation occurs, and if so,
whether the injured party can assert the same on behalf of Fruhauf. The District
and Circuit Courts found for the defendant on the main issue and the first issue.
Therefore, neither court passed upon the second issue.
1963]
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sell the underlying security to the optionee upon demand. Similarly, by
issuing the complementary put, the issuer has irrevocably bound him-
self to purchase the same underlying security. He has created rights on
the part of the optionee and has undertaken correlative legal obli-
gations neither of which existed prior to the issuance of the straddle.
The short-swing profit allegedly gained is the amount of the profit real-
ized from the premiums paid in consideration for the three options.
Once the contracts for purchase and sale are established, the
contention is that this is sufficient to fulfill the "any contract" provi-
sion as defined in section 3(a) of the act. Section 3(a) (13) and (14)
defines the term "purchase" and "sale" and the pertinent parts pro-
vide:
"Section 3(a) When used in this title, unless the context other-
wise requires-
(13) The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract
to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.
(14) The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of.' 22
This theory was rejected by both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals. Both courts recognized the existence of unilateral con-
tracts23 to purchase and sell; however, they reasoned that such con-
tracts were not contracts to purchase and sell within the scope of
section 16(b).24 The fatal element seized upon by both courts was
nSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (1958). [Emphasis
added.)
3A contract for an irrevocable offer is an option. Such contracts are unilateral
in nature since optionor is legally bound to keep his offer open for the specified
period; whereas the optionee has no legal obligation until the option is exercised.
i Williston, Contracts § 61A (3 d ed. 1957).
21 As reflected in both the District and Circuit Court opinions, a material fac-
tor used in determining whether a purchase or sale exists is the change in beneficial
ownership. The District Court acknowledged that some change in the beneficial
ownership occurred; however, the court said the asserted change was not susceptible
of exact determination at the time the option was issued. Therefore, the court re-
fused to find a purchase and sale based upon the change in beneficial ownership.
In 1935, the General Counsel of the Commission issued an opinion wherein he
stated that a "director or stockholder is to be deemed to have acquired beneficial
ownership of a security at the time when he takes a firm commitment for the pur-
chase thereof, and to divest himself of such beneficial ownership at the time when
he takes a firm commitment for the sale thereof." He further stated that if it
was uncertain whether the conditions would occur prior to the exercise of the
option, then it could not be said that the beneficial change occurred. Opinion of
General Counsel of Commission, Release No. 116, March 9, 1935, 11 Fed. Reg.
10968.
In 1961, § 240.16a-6 relating to certain transactions subject to § i6(a) was
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the unilateral nature of the option contract. Since the option contract
"fixes the obligation but not the rights of the issuer," the court said
such a contract was not within section 16(b). The District Court said:
"Not until the stock was 'Put' to him [Landa] or until he was
'Called' to sell would his option contract or continuing offer
blossom into a purchase or sale contract within the purview
of §16 (b). ' '25
Therefore, the court held that unless both the put (purchase) and
the call (sale) were exercised no purchase and sale would occur.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals added that merely because the
straddle was entered into for a speculative purpose, it did not follow
that it constituted a purchase and sale of the type proscribed by
section 16(b). The court said that section 16(b) was not intended to
penalize every speculative transaction by an insider; otherwise, the
act would not have categorically limited its impact to purchases and
sales occurring within six months.26
This statement by the Court of Appeals that section 16(b) does not
penalize every speculative transaction by an insider clearly illustrates
the problem confronting the courts in interpreting the language of
sections 3(a) and 6(b). Certainly the technical argument may be ad-
vanced that the court erred in its exclusion of the straddle from the
sanction of 16(b); however, the ultimate decision lies with the courts
as to whether they will interpret purchase and sale within section
16(b) in its broad or narrow sense.27 The introductory clause of section
3(a) provides for such discretion.2 8
In Ferraiolo v. Newman,29 the court concluded that "every trans-
action which can reasonably be defined as a purchase [or sale] will be
so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself
to the speculation encompassed by 16(b)." It would appear that Fer-
raiolo is in conflict with Silverman; however, the court in Ferraiolo
amended as follows: "The acquisition or disposition of any transferable option,
put, call, spread or straddle shall be deemed such a change in the beneficial owner-
ship of the security to which such privilege relates as to require the filing of a
statement reflecting the acquisition or disposition of such privilege." 17 C.F.R. §
24016a-6 (Supp. 1963). By recognizing the necessity of reporting such changes in
beneficial ownership, it would seem that the Commission has changed its position
concerning options; therefore, options should be considered as effecting the neces-
sary change in ownership to bring them within the purview of § 16(b) of the act.
2 oo F. Supp. at 196.
=3o6 F.-d at 425.
-.Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411 (1962) (dictum).
-Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(1958).
"'259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958).
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acknowledged that an analysis of the series of decisions3O relating to
purchase and sale showed that the approach to the problem of defin-
ing purchase and sale is pragmatic rather than technical. "Each case
has been decided on its own facts, and the enunciation of a 'black
letter rubric' has been expressly avoided."
The pragmatic approach taken by the District and Circuit Courts
in Silverman appears to be quite reasonable when considered upon
its facts, i.e., when considered in the light of the one year option con-
tracts. Little danger arises from insider profits when the option ex-
tends for a period of greater than six months, because the possibility
of abuse of insider information and manipulation varies inversely
with time. Congress has recognized that the longer stock is held, the
greater the likelihood that the market will react to factors unforeseen
by the insider.31 This is evident from the arbitrary six months limi-
tation placed on insider profits which is designed to overcome the
difficult burden of proving the link between the profit realized and
the use of the inside information.
3 2
The efficacy of the straddle becomes apparent when it is accom-
panied by an extra put or call. 33 By issuing a "strap" (a matched put
and call plus an extra call), the issuer shows confidence that the price
of the stock will drop; if this speculation is successful, he will not
lose on the premiums received for the two calls, since these options will
go unexercised. He will lose to some extent, however, on the put.
His profit will depend upon the difference between the premiums re-
ceived for the three options minus the loss suffered from the exercise
of the put, plus commission costs by the broker. Should the market
take an unexpected upswing, ,however, the issuer could offset his loss
on the calls by the amount of the premium received for the put. Thus,
the issuer can provide an element of security against losses by using
31Id. at 344. The cases analyzed appear on this page.
'IS. Rept. No. 792, 73d Congress. 2d Session. 9 (1934).
'The necessity for the six months limitation was succinctly stated before the
Senate Committee in the testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, chief spokesman for
the draftsmen of the act. 15 Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. Rep. 84, 56, and 97, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. 6557 (1934). The constitu-
tionality of the six months limitation was upheld in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
' he straddle alone may be used as a speculative device to gain a short-term
profit in the form of premiums. Using his inside knowledge, the insider may
predict with considerable accuracy that the price will not move appreciably within
the limited period of the option. The insider's market position would not be
jeopardized if the stock moved only a few points either way, unless the movement
was sufficient to offset the total amount of the broker's commission fee for the exer-
cise of the option. Filer, Understanding Put and Call Options (1959).
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the "strip" or "strap" market position. 34 Therefore, it is apparent that
the issuer can utilize his inside information to obtain a profit in the
form of premiums without fear of recapture under section 16(b), for
under the rationale of Silverman a purchase of the underlying security
would occur only if the put alone were exercised. Since a purchase
and sale are necessary to invoke section 16(b), no recapture of the
profits realized in the form of the premiums can result. The only way
to have the necessary purchase and sale is if both the put and the
call were exercised (in which case little or no profit would remain), or
unless the option, whether exercised or not, is included within the
"any contract" provision of section 3(a). Therefore, if the doctrine of
Silverman-that insider straddles unexercised or partially exercised
within a six months period do not fall within the scope of section
16(b)-is applied only to straddles issued for periods of more than
six months, it does not appear that the court has departed from the
legislative purpose of the act, for the profit will accrue after the six
months period. But, if partially unexercised short term straddles,
strips or straps (those issued for less than six months) are excluded
from the act altogether, then it is dubious whether the legislative
purpose is being accomplished, for clearly the insider is profiting
from the premiums received from his issuance of short term option
contracts.
The technical reasoning relied upon to exclude straddles from
the "any contract" provision in section 3(a), however, does not seem to
indicate that the Silverman doctrine will be applied only to straddles
exceeding six months periods. The disturbing fact remains that the
technical rationale actually used in Silverman excludes all straddles,
unless both the put and the call are exercised irrespective of their dura-
tion, from the term purchase and sale. If this is true, then options
may be issued for periods of less than six months and the insider's
information may greatly enhance the possibility of turning over a
conservative short-swing profit in the form of a premium without any
fear of corporate recovery. A rule allowing insiders to realize profits
from such practices would not be in accord with the legislative pur-
pose of the act.
The danger of permitting insider speculation of short term strad-
dles can be eliminated either by judicial decision or through admin-
"The economic purpose of the option, singly or in combination, "is to serve as
insurance against future market movements. For example, a person who is long
may purchase a put as insurance that he will be able to sell if the market falls to
a certain level, and a person who is short may purchase a call to ensure that he
will be able to cover (buy) if the market rises to a certain figure." Loss, Securities
Regulation 468 (ad ed. 1961).
